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IV 
Statement of Interest and Identification of Amici Curiae 
Amicus Curiae, the Utah Alliance to Protect Property Rights (Alliance), 
submits this brief to provide the court additional legal and practical context in 
which to evaluate the parties' arguments concerning whether HB 141 is 
constitutional. The Alliance is a non-profit organization that represents the 
interests of landowners whose property is affected by the operation of HB 141. 
Its members are dedicated to increasing public awareness of private property 
rights, including water rights and the rights incident to private ownership of 
stream beds. The Alliance provides legal support and assistance to landowners 
in cases where legal issues may have a broad impact on property rights. It also 
encourages and supports the enactment of laws that secure property rights. 
One representative member of the Alliance is the Utah Farm Bureau 
Federation, which was formed in 1916 to protect, promote, and assert business, 
economic, social, and educational interests of farming and ranching families. 
Today, many of the more than 28,000 Utah Farm Bureau Federation members 
hold title to lands adjacent to water bodies, including the beds under non-
navigable water bodies, in both rural and urban areas. Other members of the 
Alliance include families with recreational property, agricultural property, or 
residences adjacent to rivers, streams, or lakes. Alliance members also include 
recreational anglers who support a balanced approach to legislative control of 
property rights and public access to waterways. 
1 
The Alliance contends that HB 141 was a valid exercise of legislative 
authority to regulate the use of state assets and supports Victory Ranch 
Acquisitions (VRA) in its appeal of the Hon. Derek A. Pullan's judgment 
declaring unconstitutional certain sections of the Public Waters Access Act, Utah 
Code sections 73-29-101 et seq. 
Statement of the Issues 
The Alliance adopts the statement of issues and standards of review as 
well as the statement of the case and statement of facts submitted by Appellant 
VRA. 
Summary of the Argument 
Based on the history of water rights and their regulation in Utah, HB 141 
represents a valid exercise of the legislature's authority to balance public and 
private interests in the use of public resources. 
The district court ruled that the public has a constitutional right to access 
private beds of non-navigable public waters for recreational purposes under 
article XVII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.l The district court's conclusion is 
contrary to the text and history of that provision. It was intended simply to 
assure that the owners of pre-statehood water rights would not lose those rights 
at statehood. The district court's conclusion is also inconsistent with Conatser v. 
I That section provides that "[a]ll existing rights to the use of any waters in 
this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and 
confirmed." Utah Const. art. XVII, § 1. 
2 
Johnson, 2008 UT 48, 194 P.3d 897, in which this court referred to the public's 
right to access waters for recreation as grounded in statute (Conatser easement). 
Having found a constitutional basis for the Conatser easement, and 
concluded that the easement was public trust property protected by article XX, 
section 1, the district court proceeded to determine if a disposition whether the 
trust property had been" disposed of," and, if so, whether it was a breach of 
trust. 2 Rather than applying the common public trust analysis of Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), which this court adopted in Coleman v. 
Utah State Land Bd. 795 P.2d 622, 635-36 (Utah 1990), the district court created a 
new public trust analysis. That analytical model includes a new interpretation of 
article XX, section 1' s threshold requirement that trust property be "disposed of" 
before a breach can be found. Under the district court's definition, trust property 
is "disposed of" when it is merely regulated by the state. 
Concluding that the Conatser easement was "regulated" by HB 141, the 
district court applied to that regulation a second part of its Utah public trust 
analysis, a multifactorial balancing test which subjected HB 141 to a reasonable 
ends and means analysis. As a consequence, it found HB 141 unconstitutional. In 
2 "All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be granted to the 
State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any 
person or corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, 
and, except as provided in Section 2 of the Article, are declared to be the public 
lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as 
may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or 
may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired." UTAH CONST. art. XX, 
§ 1. 
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the processf the district court created a test that exposes every legislative 
regulation of public lands to judicial review under its new public trust analysis. 
The ruling would hobble the ability of the state to manage public assets and 
encourage litigation over every effort to do so. 
The Alliance joins VRA in asking this court to reverse the district courf s 
ruling that HB 141 is unconstitutional. 
Argument 
1. The public's right to use the private beds of public waters is a recent 
judicial creation grounded on a legislative action; HB 141 permissibly 
alters the balance struck by this court's decisions 
At the time Utah became a statef disputes over water did not consider 
recreational uses. Ratherf they centered on competing productive uses for 
irrigationf watering animalsf miningf and industry. During the constitutional 
convention in 1895, farmers expressed concern that when ownership of the 
public waters would be transferred from the United States to Utah upon 
statehoodf their private rights to use their appropriated water might be 
extinguished. In responsef the constitutional convention inserted Article XVII, 
Section 1. It statesf "All existing rights to the use of any waters in this State for 
any useful or beneficial purposef are hereby recognized and confirmed." UTAH 
CONST. art. XVII,§ 1. Not until1903 did the Utah Legislature statutorily 
recognize public ownership of waters in what would become the predecessor to 
4 
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Utah Code section 73-1-1. See 1903 Laws of Utah, Ch. 100, Sec. 47. Nothing in the 
Utah Constitution spoke to it. 
In 1971 the legislature amended Utah Code section 73-3-8 to require the 
State Engineer to broaden the factors considered in analyzing possible claims of 
interference with beneficial uses to include the recreational use of water.3 Based 
upon the 1971 amendment, this court, in 1982, created the public's right to the 
recreational use of public waters in J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). 
The court acknowledged this sixteen years later in Conatser v. Johnson, when it 
stated that we "established our own rule that the public has 'the right to float 
leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that 
water."' 2008 UT 48, ,-r14, 194 P.3d 897 (quoting J.J.N.P. Co., 655 P.2d at 1136-
1137)(emphasis added). In Conatser, the court held that the right to the 
recreational water use includes "touching" privately owned beds, i.e. the 
Conatser easement. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ,-r 19. The court based its holding on 
3 " ... that where the state engineer, because of information in his possession 
obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to believe that 
an application to appropriate water will interfere with its more beneficial use for 
irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining development 
or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural 
stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it shall be 
his duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the application until he shall 
have investigated the matter." Utah Code §73-3-8 (1971) (emphasis added) 
(attached as Addendum A. This was originally attached as Exhibit C to the 
Alliances first brief, filed Nov. 7, 2011 (R. 535). However, it and the other two 
exhibits were inadvertently omitted from the appellate record. Instead, a 
separate group of exhibits, unrelated to the Alliance's amicus brief, appear to 
have replaced them. SeeR. 553-628). 
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own interpretation of the Utah Code and its prior precedent, not on the Utah 
Constitution. Id. ,-r,-r 8-19. 
Following Conatser, the legislature chose to address the balance struck by 
this court between legislatively grounded recreational user rights and landowner 
rights to the private beds of non-navigable public waters. In choosing to define 
legislatively the scope of the public right to use public waters recreationally, the 
legislature noted a number of problems arising after Conatser, such as 
"widespread unauthorized invasion of private property for recreation purposes." 
Utah Code § 73-29-103(2). In its deliberations, the legislature considered itself to 
be weighing the rights of the public in public waters, under Article XX, Section 1, 
and the rights of owners of private beds underlying public waters not to have 
their property "taken or damaged for public use without just compensation," 
under Article I, Section 22. Recognizing that the balancing of those rights is 
difficult, the legislature judged HB 141 to be a reasonable compromise on a 
"difficult, intricate, and emotional topic." Recording of Utah House Floor 
Debates, HB 141 First Substitute, 58th Leg., 2010 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 23, 2010) 
(statement of Rep. Sheryl L. Allen). As the sponsor of the bill explained, he tried 
"to draft something that truly would harmonize constitutional protections [of 
private property] with trying to give as much access to the fishermen as we could 
without violating those principles." Id. (statement of Rep. Kay L. Mclff). 
6 
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HB 141 is the first Utah statute to expressly recognize the public's right to 
use waters recreationally. In recognizing that right, HB 141 clarified that the 
public's right to recreationally use waters that flow over private property does 
not stem from that part of the Utah Code declaring public ownership of water, 
i.e., the portion of the Code which was first enacted in 1903. Specifically, it states 
that public ownership of water" does not create or recognize an easement for 
public recreational use on private property." Utah Code§ 73-1-1(2). Instead, the 
scope of that recreational right is recognized and governed by Chapter 29 of Title 
73. Id. § 73-1-1(4). 
HB 141 altered the scope of the right to use public waters struck by 
Conatser. Id. § 73-29-103. HB 141 affirms the right to "touch" privately owned 
beds under public waters to allow "safe passage and continued movement" or 
"portage around a dangerous obstruction" while floating public waters. Id. § 73-
29-202(2). But it does not allow the public to remain on the privately owned beds 
unless (i) the owner consents or (ii) the public has so used the particular bed for 
at leastlO consecutive years after 1982. Id. § 73-29-201(2), -202(3), -203(1). 
Otherwise, when property is fenced or posted as private, the public's recreational 
use right does not include touching privately owned beds. Id. § 73-29-102(5). 
The legitimacy of the legislature's concerns about the impact of Conatser is 
confirmed by evidence presented to the district court in this case. This evidence 
included a number of declarations documenting problems with trespassers, cut 
7 
- - -~~ 
-, 
fences, and litter, as well as resulting dangers to the public.4 Randy Sessions, the 
owner of property along the Weber River in Morgan County, had his fence, 
which crosses the river, cut the Monday after the Conatser opinion was released. 
(R.366). Larry Hays, the owner of residential property along the Millcreek stream 
in Salt Lake City, experienced a surge of people fishing in his backyard after the 
Conatser opinion was published. (R.375) Tim Simonsen, the owner of property 
along the Provo River in Summit County, had his fences cut numerous times. 
(R.371) As a result, his horses left the property and walked onto State Highway 
35. (Id.) Additionally, due to cut fences, a neighbor's cows crossed onto 
Simonsen's property and caused damage. (R.372) Randy James, the owner of 
property on the Smith and Morehouse Creek in Summit County, dealt with 
cleaning up trash and waste from trespassers who camped and started fires on 
his property. (R. 368) James stated that the fence around his property is cut at 
least once a year. (Id.) 
The balance struck by HB 141 between the public right to the recreational 
use of non-navigable public waters with the rights of owners of the private beds 
beneath them is a reasonable solution reached after careful consideration of 
competing interests. The legislature has not given public property to private 
property owners; it has simply chosen to strike a different balance than this court 
did in Conatser in administering the public's property for the benefit of all. 
4 These declarations are attached at Addendum B 
8 
Should experience prove adjustments are needed, the legislature can take up the 
issue again, as it is uniquely equipped to do. 
The district court's decision declaring parts of HB 141 unconstitutional 
misconceived the basis of Conatser and overreached in attempting to formulate a 
judicial remedy for what is a quintessentially legislative line drawing problem. 
2. The district court's reliance on Article XVII, Section 1 as establishing the 
public's right to access public waters for recreation is contradicted by the 
plain language and the history of that provision 
The district court expressly declined to accept Conatser's statement that the 
easement it was creating was grounded on a legislative recognition of the 
recreational use of legislatively created public waters. (R. 747)5 Instead, the 
district court chose to rely on general and soaring dicta from Adams v. Portage 
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co. concerning the "right of the public" to" drink or 
dip ... or water his animals" in public waters as this court's operative 
pronouncement on Article XVII, Section 1. 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 1937). The 
district court concluded that the language in Adams vouchsafed to the public all 
possible uses of public waters. (R. 741-47) And it stated that until the Utah 
Supreme Court "revisits the scope of Article XVII, Section 1, Adams remains good 
law." (R. 747) The district court ignored the fact that Adams, like the other pre-
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State decisions of this court, dealt with traditional appropriative 
uses of public waters. See e.g. Chandler v. Utah Copper Co., 135 P. 106, 109 (Utah 
5 Ruling and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, May 21, 
2012, R. 729, attached as Addendum E. 
9 
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1913); Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 205 P.2d 255 (Utah 1949); see also VRA Opening 
Brief, p. 19. None deal with recreational uses. 
This reading of Article XVII, Section 1 is erroneous as a matter of grammar 
and history. Article XVII, Section 1 states, "All existing rights to the use of any of 
the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized 
and confirmed." (Emphasis added.) This language refers to the location of the 
waters, not their ownership, as we demonstrate below. This court need not go 
beyond the plain language of the constitutional provision to declare that HB 141 
does not violate Article XVII, Section 1. State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ,-r 4, 100 P.3d 
1218 (courts "look first to the plain meaning of the constitutional provision" and 
do "not inquire beyond the plain meaning ... unless [they] find it ambiguous") 
(citations omitted). 
Article XVII, Section 1 "recognized and confirmed" then-existing rights to 
the use of the waters in Utah. As reflected throughout the 1895 Constitutional 
Convention debates over Article XVII, Section 1, the provision was designed to 
"appease the apprehension" or "appease the unsettled feeling" of farmers who 
wanted some assurance that their title to irrigation water would not transfer to 
the state upon statehood. (Addendum C, pp. 1207, 1209-10)6 Those debating the 
provision argued that Article XVII, Section 1"would be harmless," perhaps even 
6 Addendum C was originally Exhibit A to the Alliances first brief as 
referenced in footnote 1. 
10 
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"wholly unnecessary," because vested rights could not be disturbed by the 
advent of statehood. (Id. at 1207, 1209) Much of the debate centered upon 
whether the provision was necessary at all. (Id. at 1207-10; Addendum D at 1233)7 
The next day during the final reading of Article XVII, Section 1, Mr. Coray 
moved to strike the provision because it was "perfectly worthless." (Addendum 
D at 1233) In defense of the provision, Mr. Maloney explained that "this is a 
constitutional recognition of existing rights." (Id.) In the face of further argument 
that the provision was unnecessary, Mr. Thoreson explained that "the irrigators 
throughout this Territory are asking that something be inserted in the 
Constitution acknowledging the rights that they paid so dearly for and which 
they prize so much." (Id.) Mr. Thatcher then explained that the provision "can do 
no harm," but with its inclusion in the Constitution "the farmers will know that 
this Convention wished them to retain acquired rights." (I d.) 
To make clear that Article XVII, Section 1 applied only to private rights, 
not public rights, Mr. Varian then proposed that "of the State" be changed to "in 
the State" because "there are no existing rights in anybody to the waters of the 
State- that is belonging to the State." (I d.) The amendment passed. Then, to 
make clear that not all private uses of water were confirmed by Article XVII, 
Section 1, but only those that fit within the appropriation scheme for allocating 
7 Addendum D was originally Exhibit C to the Alliances first brief as 
referenced in footnote 1. 
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water, Mr. Hart proposed that the words "or beneficial" be inserted after the 
word "useful." (Id.) With that amendment, Article XVII, Section 1 took its present 
form. 
What the language of Article XVII, Section 1 and the debates over that 
language reveal is, first, that Article XVII, Section 1 was to protect only private 
rights to water. It provided assurance to the uneasy by "recognizing and 
confirming" existing rights to use the waters in the State. Article XVII did not 
place the scope of the public right to use public waters, especially for recreational 
use, beyond legislative control. It only precludes the legislature from any attempt 
to deny that vested rights to appropriate water, existing prior to statehood, 
survived the transition to statehood. 
Second, Article XVII, Section 1 applies only to the right to use waters "for 
any useful or beneficial purpose." Putting waters to a uuseful or beneficial 
purpose" is how one acquires the right to appropriate water for private use in 
Utah. Utah Code § 73-1-3; Becker v. Marble Creek Irr. Co., 49 P. 892, 893 (Utah 1897) 
("The great weight of modern authority is to the effect that when an appropriator 
permits part of the water appropriated to run to waste, or fails to use a certain 
portion of it for some beneficial use or purpose, he can only hold that part of the 
water which has been actually applied to a beneficial use, and his right is limited 
to the quantity so used."). Article XVII, Section 1 does not encompass uses that 
are non-appropriative. And touching a private bed while using waters 
12 
recreationally does not qualify as use "for any useful or beneficial purpose" 
under the appropriation statutes. Thus, even if the Conatser easement existed in 
1896-which it did not-its legislative extinguishment could not implicate 
Article XVII, Section 1. 
Third, Article XVII, Section 1 is not directed to waters "of" the state, which 
would be the phrasing if the drafters were addressing public ownership, but only 
to waters "in" the state. As Mr. Varian stated, "there are no existing rights in 
anybody to the waters of the State- that is belonging to the State." It is notable 
that the district court, in rejecting arguments that Conatser had acknowledged the 
statutory foundation of recreational use rights, and relying on Adams for a 
constitutional grounding, misquoted the language of Article XVII, Section 1. The 
district court cited the article as confirming existing rights to "waters of the 
State." (R. 744) Mr. Varian seems to have anticipated the district court's reading 
of the provision and attempted to forestall it, unfortunately without success. 
The district court's effort to find in Article XVII, Section 1 a public right to 
use the waters of the state recreationally must fail. No such public right to use 
public waters recreationally "existed" in 1896. And it was certainly not 
consciously constitutionalized by those drafting this article. As this court has 
stated, that right was "established" in 1982, based on the 1971legislative 
mandate that the State Engineer consider recreational uses when judging claims 
13 
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of interference with water rights. Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, ,-r 14, (quoting 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d at 1137). 
The district court erred when it declared that public ownership of natural 
waters was embedded in Article XVII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. The Utah public trust doctrine announced by the district court and 
grounded on Article XX, Section 1 departs from the Illinois Central 
analysis adopted by this court and creates an unworkable regime of 
judicial oversight of legislative function 
The district court's unique Utah public trust doctrine developed as this 
case progressed, as the brief of VR Acquisitions documents. (VRA, Opening 
Briet p. 30) The district court first concluded in its May 21, 2012 Ruling and 
Order that HB 141 did not violate the common law public trust doctrine 
articulated in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), nor did it 
violate Article XX, Section 1. (R. 763-64) The district court then invited the parties 
to address in additional briefing possible sources of a broader Utah-specific 
public trust doctrine and how the district court might articulate such a standard. 
The district court recognized that this task presented "a host of issues of first 
impression." (R. 766) This invitation was based on the court's conclusion that 
Article XVII, Section 1 protected the public's recreation use of public waters. (R. 
747) 
Following briefing and argument, the district court issued its March 8, 
2013 Ruling and Order. (R. 1093) There, the district court, in effect, created a Utah 
public trust doctrine broader in reach and analytically distinct from the Illinois 
14 
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Central public trust doctrine. (R. 1098-1114)8 As will be shown, that effort went 
awry. 
The district court first explained that the Utah public trust doctrine "is 
established in Article XX, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution," (R. 1098), which 
provides that public lands "shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of 
as may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been 
or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired." UTAH CONST. Art 
XX,§ 1 (emphasis added). It then explained, quoting from that constitutional 
provision, that" Article XX, Section 1 is implicated when the State 'disposes' of 
public lands." (R. 1099) And it noted that no such disposition had been made by 
HB 141. "In adopting [HB 141], the Legislature did not 'dispose' of or transfer 
title to all or part [of] the public's easement in waters of the State of Utah. In fact, 
the easement exists in public ownership today. Rather, in adopting [HB 141] the 
Legislature regulated use of the public's easement." (R. 1099-1100) 
The district court could- and should- have ended. its analysis there, 
reasoning that because HB 141 does not dispose of the public's easement in 
Utah's waters, it does not implicate Article XX, Section 1 and Utah's public trust 
doctrine. To do so would have been consistent with its earlier conclusion that the 
8 Ruling and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment re: Plaintiff's 
Standing and the Public Trust Doctrine, March 8, 2013, R. 1093, attached as 
Addendum F. 
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Illinois Central public trust doctrine had no application because under that test no 
public property had been" disposed of." (R. 764) 
But the district court did not stop there. Rather, it proceeded to redefine 
the "issue" to be "whether the public trust under Article XX, Section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution limits the Legislature's authority to regulate use of the public's 
easement in waters of the State of Utah?" (R. 1100 (emphasis added)). Stated 
differently, the district court asked, "[w]hether a statute can so narrowly limit 
public use of waters in place as to be the functional equivalent of the state 
'disposing' of the public's easement in violation of the public trust recognized in 
Article XX, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution?" (R. 1108) The district court 
determined that this could occur and, in so doing, articulated a new standard for 
determining whether regulatory legislation, like HB 141, violates the public trust 
doctrine. Under the district court's formulation, a court faced with a contention 
that the Utah public trust doctrine has been violated by a legislative regulation 
must address the following questions: 
(1) Whether the statute regulates interests protected by the public 
trust? 
(2) Whether the public easement was disposed of for the 
purposes of which it was acquired? 
(3) Whether the state has given up its right of control over the 
public's easement? 
(4) Whether disposing of the public's easement promoted the 
interests of the public therein, or was accomplished without 
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands 
and waters that remain? 
16 
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(R. 1111-12) This test appears to be a logical set of questions, each one of which 
has to be answered "yes" or "no" before proceeding to the next question. But in 
operation, it is a multifactorial balancing test, one without a predictable outcome. 
Having set out its analytical model, the district court next addressed the 
first three questions. First, it concluded that HB 141 does regulate an interest 
protected by the public trust. (R. 1112) Second, it concluded that HB 141 does not 
promote the interest at issue, "public access to and use of state waters." (R. 1113) 
As to the third issue, the district court again asserted that HB 141 did not dispose 
of anything: 
By enacting the Public Waters Access Act, this state did not give up 
its right to control the public easement. Rather, the Act constitutes 
an assertion of that right. ... As stated in the [May 21, 2012 Ruling 
and Order], the Act did not transfer any property interest to private 
landowners. "The public's easement in its full scope ... has not been 
transferred to private parties, abrogated, or abandoned and remains 
in public ownership today." 
(R. 1114) 
Perplexingly, even though the district court answered its own third 
question in the negative, which would suggest the end to the analysis if the test 
were syllogistic, it next stated that a disputed issue of material fact existed as to 
the fourth question which precluded summary judgment on the question of 
whether HB 141 violates the public trust doctrine. (R. 1114-15) The fourth 
question, of course, is taken from the test applied by the Supreme Court of the 
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United States in Illinois Central, after it had determined as a threshold matter that 
public trust property had been" disposed of." Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-454. 
In sum, despite its earlier conclusions that HB 141 does not "dispose of" a 
public trust resource, the court gradually developed a broader meaning of what 
constitutes a" disposition," ultimately adopting a Utah-unique meaning at odds 
with Illinois Central and with common usage. By the time it rendered its 
November 4, 2015 Ruling, Order, and Final Judgment, the district court had 
defined "to dispose of" to include any "legislative act ordering, controlling, 
regulating, or managing public lands." (R. 2642)9 The court ruled that Article XX, 
Section 1 "applies broadly to 'all lands ... otherwise acquired' by the State." (R. 
2641) 
Upon reflection, it is clear that under the district court's definition of 
11 dispose of," any action, including II a mere lease of public land to a private 
party," may legitimately be subject to challenge as violating the Utah public trust 
doctrine. (R. 2643) Conflict between the legislature and judiciary is likely as every 
legislative action to regulate use of public lands, or executive implementation of 
legislatively delegated discretion, has a clear potential to give rise to an Article 
XX, Section 1 challenge. And that challenge is to be measured by the four 
element test the district court created, no one element of which appears capable 
9 Ruling, Order and Final Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff Utah Stream 
Access Coalition, Nov. 4, 2015, R. 2602, attached at Addendum G. 
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of ending the analysis. Any public regulation may be unconstitutional if it is 
weighed and found wanting in some balancing of the factors listed. 
The last of the district court's four factors is composed of the "substantial 
impairment" language from Illinois Central. 146 U.S. at 452-53. That might be 
thought to give some comfort, as the Illinois Central test has been applied without 
alarm for over a century. However, while the district court adopted this part of 
the Illinois Central test, it rejected the threshold requirement the Supreme Court 
said had to be met before there could be application of the "substantial 
impairment" test- that public trust property had been" disposed of." Taken by 
itself, Illinois Central's "without any substantial impairment of the public interest 
in the lands and waters remaining" test is vague and lacking in analytical clarity. 
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. Despite its lineage, it cannot, by itself, carry the 
weight the district court assigns it. 
Because the district court's multi-factorial public trust doctrine test is not 
limited to measures that actually dispose of a public asset, but can reach any 
regulation that even temporarily constricts some public use, the final" sul?stantial 
impairment" element of the district court's test has no boundaries and, like the 
first three elements of the test, is non-dispositive. For this reason, the district 
court's test would not appear to permit the grant of a summary judgment in any 
case because ordinarily a fact question will be presented as to whether a 
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regulation that does not actually "dispose of" a public trust asset restricts that 
asset impermissibly, and, therefore, violates Article XX, Section 1. 
The Alliance suggests that this court should reject the district court's new 
rule and settle on the standard for applying the public trust doctrine that has 
been explicitly used in other Utah cases, one that is sufficient to address the 
issues in this case. In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, Utah adopted the common 
law public trust doctrine as defined in Illinois Central. 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 
1990). That test sets as a threshold requirement whether the public trust asset has 
been "disposed of." As has been previously discussed, early in this case, the 
district court repeatedly said that this requirement had not been met by HB 141. 
• "The public's easement in its full scope as defined in J.J.N.P. and 
Conatser has not been transferred to private parties, abrogated, or 
abandoned and remains in public ownership today." (R. 759) 
• "Article XX, Section 1 is implicated only if HB 141 'disposed of' the 
public's easement in State waters .... [T]he Court holds that HB 141 
did not dispose of all or part of the public's easement in waters of 
the State. Rather, it regulated the lawful use of those waters. 
Therefore, HB 141 does not implicate the trust responsibilities· 
imposed upon the State in Article XX, section 1." (R. 763) 
• "In adopting [HB 141], the Legislature did not 'dispose' of or 
transfer title to all or part [of] the public's easement in waters of the 
State of Utah. In fact, the easement exists in public ownership 
today." (R. 1099-1110) 
• "A future Legislature may strike a different balance between 
public recreational users and private land owners." (R. 759) 
Under Illinois Central, the question of whether a state action impairs the 
public trust resource is a nonissue unless and until it is determined that the 
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resource has been alienated by the state. Because there has been no alienation of 
public trust assets, as the district court found, HB 141 is neither violative of the 
public trust doctrine nor of Article XX, Section 1. The legislature has not wholly 
abandoned the public trust resource at issue. It retains control of the property 
and can revoke HB 141 at any time. This court should confirm that the legislature 
had the authority to adjust the balance to be struck between owners of the beds 
of non-navigable waters and recreational users of public waters, and uphold the 
constitutionality of HB 141. 
Conclusion 
For these reasons and those stated in VRA's Opening Brief, the Alliance 
asks this court to reverse the district court's ruling declaring parts of HB 141 
unconstitutional. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2016. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER 
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